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Abstract
Languages diﬀer dramatically in how much they require their speakers to mark the timing of events
when speaking. In this paper I test the hypothesis that being required to speak diﬀerently about future
events (what linguists call strongly grammaticalized future-time reference) leads speakers to treat the
future as more distant, and to take fewer future-oriented actions. Consistent with this hypothesis I
ﬁnd that in every major region of the world, speakers of strong-FTR languages save less per year, hold
less retirement wealth, smoke more, are more likely to be obese, and suﬀer from worse long-run health.
This holds true even after extensive controls that compare only demographically similar individuals born
and living in the same country. While not dispositive, the evidence does not seem to support the most
obvious forms of common causation. Implications of these ﬁndings for theories of intertemporal choice
are discussed.
∗Comments are welcome at 135 Prospect St, New Haven CT, 06511, or at keith.chen@yale.edu. I am indebted to Judy
Chevalier, Shane Frederick, Emily Oster, Sharon Oster, Ben Polak, and seminar participants at Yale and Berkeley for invaluable
feedback. The most recent version of this working paper is available at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/keithchen/. Keywords:
language, time preferences, savings behavior, health, national savings rates. JEL Codes: D03, D14, D91, E21, I10.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Languages diﬀer dramatically in how much they require their speakers to indicate the timing of
events when speaking about them. For example, a German speaker predicting precipitation can
naturally do so in the present tense, saying: “Es regnet morgen” which translates to: “It rain
tomorrow”. In contrast, English would require the use of the future tense, “It will rain tomorrow”.
Could this characteristic of language inﬂuence speakers’ intertemporal choices?
In this paper I test the hypothesis that being required to speak in a grammatically distinct way
about future events leads speakers to treat the future as more distant, and to take fewer future-
oriented actions. Put another way, I ask whether a habit of speech which treats the present and
future diﬀerently, can lead to a habit of mind that treats future rewards as more distant.
To do so, I draw on the Linguistics literature on future-time reference (FTR), which documents
large amounts of variation in the degree to which languages require distinct grammatical treatment
of present and future events. These diﬀerences are surprisingly large, even within small geographical
regions. For example Western Europeans speak languages that range from having no future tense
(like Finnish), to languages in which verbs have distinct and obligatory future forms (like Spanish).
I examine how these diﬀerences in languages’ FTR correlate with their speaker’s future-oriented
behaviors such as saving, exercising, and abstaining from smoking. I also look at the cumulative
eﬀects of these behaviors such as retirement savings and long-run health. To avoid conﬂating
diﬀerences in languages with other diﬀerences in the economic or social environment, my analysis
includes extensive controls for individual and family characteristics, including country of birth
and residence. Eﬀectively, I only compare individuals who have the same demographics, family
structure, and country of birth and residence, but who speak diﬀerent languages.
Consistent with my hypothesis, I ﬁnd that speakers of languages with little to no grammatical
distinction between the present and future (weak-FTR speakers) engage in much more future-
oriented behavior. Weak-FTR speakers are 30% more likely to have saved in any given year, and
have accumulated an additional 170 thousand Euros by retirement. Extending my analysis to look
at non-monetary investments in health, I ﬁnd that by retirement, weak-FTR speakers are in better
health by numerous measures; they are 24% less likely to have smoked heavily, are 29% more likely
to be physically active, and are 13% less likely to be medically obese.
I then attempt to determine if diﬀerences in language are directly causing these diﬀerences in be-
havior, or if these correlations derive from cultural values or traits that are coincident with language
diﬀerences. For example, most (but not all) Germanic languages have a weakly-grammaticalized
future tense: could there also be a “Germanic” cultural value towards savings that is widely held
by Germanic-language speakers but not directly caused by language? While not dispositive, the
evidence does not seem to support the most obvious forms of common causation.
Most notably, several waves of the World Values Survey asked respondents about both their
savings behavior, the language which they speak at home, and the degree to which “savings and
thrift is an important value to teach children”. I ﬁnd that both a language’s FTR and the degree to
which a person thinks savings is an important value predict savings behavior. Interestingly though,
these eﬀects are completely independent: neither eﬀect attenuates nor boosts the other. Indeed, in
the World Values Survey a language’s FTR is almost entirely uncorrelated with its speakers’ stated
values towards savings ( = −007). This suggests that the language eﬀects I identify operate
through a channel which is independent of conscious attitudes towards savings.
Finally, I examine the eﬀect that this diﬀerential propensity to save has on national savings rates
of OECD countries. Several interesting patterns emerge. First, the FTR of a country’s language
has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on that countries aggregate savings rate. Countries with weak FTR save, on
average, 6 percent more of their GDP per year than their strong-FTR counterparts. This eﬀect is
1unchanged by the addition of life-cycle savings control variables, and holds in every major region
of the world.
Second, this ﬁnding reverses the long-standing pattern of northern-European countries saving
more that their southern counterparts. In speciﬁc, language eﬀects induce an aggregation reversal
in European savings rates. That is, while it is true that northern-European countries tend to save
more, northern-Europeans also tend to speak weak-FTR languages. Once the eﬀect of language
is accounted for the eﬀect of Latitude ﬂips; within language classes, northern-European countries
actually save less than their southern counterparts. This suggests that what has been commonly
thought of as a north-versus-south divide in savings rates may actually be more fully explained by
language.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the linguistics literature on future-time ref-
erence (FTR), details the ways it diﬀers across languages, and lays out my hypothesis. Section 3
details my empirical methods and the data I use for estimation. Section 4 presents the conditional
correlations between a language’s FTR and its speakers future-oriented behaviors. More detailed
regressions investigate the degree to which these correlations can be taken as evidence of causation.
A ﬁnal set of regressions investigates the relationship between language and national savings rates
within the OECD. Section 5 discusses issues surrounding the interpretation of these results before
concluding.
2 Languages and Future-Time Reference
The ways languages require their speakers to speak about the future diﬀer in two fundamental
ways. Languages can diﬀer in both how and when they require speakers to signal that they are
talking about the future. For example, English (like all European languages), marks the future by
modifying a sentence’s verb. For example, I walked to work today, and will walk tomorrow if the
sun is out. In contrast, many languages require speakers to distinguish future events by modifying
a sentence’s noun. For example, a Hausa speaker would use the future marker z¯ a, more literally
saying that “future me” (z¯ an ì ), walks to work tomorrow, unless “future it” (z¯ aà ) is raining.1
More subtly, languages also diﬀer in when they require speakers to specify the timing of events,
or when that timing can be left implied. The linguist Roman Jakobson explained this diﬀerence
as: “Languages diﬀer essentially in what they must convey and not in what they may convey.” For
example, if I wanted to explain to an English-speaking colleague why I wasn’t at lunch, I would
be obliged to tell him that I went to a seminar, speaking in the past tense. If I were speaking
Mandarin (which has no tenses), it would be quite natural for me to say I go (qù)t oas e m i n a r ,
omitting all markers of time since the context leaves little room for misunderstanding. In this way,
English forces its speakers to habitually attend to the timing of events in a way that Mandarin does
not. Of course, this does not mean that Mandarin speakers are unable to understand the concept
of time, only that they are not required to attend to it every time they speak.
These diﬀerences in the use of the future tense are surprisingly widespread, and even occur
within native languages of the same country. For example Thieroﬀ (2000) documents what Dahl
(2000) calls a “futureless area” in Northern and Central Europe, including the Fino-Ugrian and all
Germanic languages except English. European languages range from a tendency to never distinguish
present and future time (like Finnish) to languages like French, which have separate “future” forms
1Hausa is a member of the West-Chadic genus and one of the most common language in Nigeria. See Dryer (2011)
for a general introduction to Hausa scholarship, and see Newman (2000) for a comprehensive treatment of the future
tense in Hausa.
2of verbs.2 A Finnish speaker, for example, would say both Tänään on kylmää (today is cold)
and Huomenna on kylmää (tomorrow is cold) using the unmarked verb on, while French speakers
w o u l ds w i t c hf r o mIl fait froid aujourd’hui (it is cold today), to Il fera froid demain (it will-be cold
tomorrow). English is a notable outlier in Europe; in all other Germanic languages the use of the
future tense is optional (and considered formal) when making predictions that have no intentional
component.3 That is, while a German speaker predicting precipitation or forecasting a freeze could
say: Es regnet morgen,o rMorgen ist es kalt (both in the present tense), an English speaker would
have to use the future tense (it will rain tomorrow, and tomorrow will be cold).
2.1 Future-Time Reference and a Linguistic-Savings Hypothesis
In this paper, I investigate the hypothesis that people whose languages require them to habitually
mark future events as distinct will treat the future as more distant. Put another way, I ask whether
a habit of speech to treat the present and future as distinct, can lead to a habit of mind that treats
future rewards as more distant. This would lead speakers to take up fewer future-oriented actions;
in general the attractiveness of current pain for future reward is declining in how distant the payoﬀ
feels. If this hypothesis is right, holding all else constant people who speak languages in which the
future and present are grammatically indistinguishable should save, exercise, and plan more, and
spend, smoke, and over-consume less.
3D a t a a n d M e t h o d s
3.1 Coding Languages
In all of the regressions to follow the independent variable of main interest is “strong future-time
reference”. This is meant to summarize whether in general a language generally requires the use of
the future tense when speaking about future events.
Most analyses in this paper (Tables 4 through 9), study speakers of European languages. In
those regressions,“StrongFTR” corresponds perfectly with what Dahl (2000) calls “futureless” lan-
guages and Thieroﬀ (2000) calls “weakly-grammaticalized future” languages. Dahl deﬁnes “future-
less” languages as those which require “the obligatory use [of the future tense] in (main clause)
prediction-based contexts”. That is, English is a “strong FTR” language because the future tense
is obligatory, even if the speaker has no control over the outcome being predicted (e.g., tomorrow
it will be sunny). Thieroﬀ notes that at least in Europe, this distinction maps more generally onto
whether future events can be left unmarked (i.e. discussed in the present tense). That is, the use
of the future tense in prediction-based contexts maps onto the broader question of whether the use
of the future tense is obligatory.
Some regressions (Tables 1, 2, and 3) analyze the World-Values Survey, whose participants
speak many non-European languages not analyzed in either Dahl or Thieroﬀ.T o e x t e n d t h e i r
characterization to this broader set, I rely on several other cross-linguistic analyses that have
studied the future tense (most notably Bybee et al. 1994, Dahl 1984, Nurse 2008, and Cyﬀer et
al. 2009), and on individual grammars for languages that are extensively spoken in the WVS but
not covered by these broader analyses. A table of all languages included in this study and their
2Languages where verbs or pronouns have distinct future forms are said to have an "inﬂectional" future. In Europe,
this includes most romance languges (except Romanian and Portuguese), and many Slavic and Semitic languages.
See Dahl (1985) for source data on inﬂectional futures in Europe, and Dryer (2011) for a broad survey of inﬂectional
futures around the world.
3This diﬀerence between intentional and purely-predictive statements about the future maps loosely onto the
traditional distinction in English between will and shall. See chapter two of Fowler (1908), for details.
3coding is in the appendix, and a complete description of my coding of languages can be found on
my website.4
3.2 Savings Regressions in the WVS
My ﬁrst set of regressions examines the World-Values Survey (2009), which was intended to be a
global survey of world cultures and values. Although ﬁve waves of the WVS are available, I study
only the last three, which ran from 1994 to 2007. In these (but not earlier) waves, participants
were asked what language they normally speak at home, which I use a proxy for the language most
likely to structure their thought. This allows me to study individuals across a set of 79 countries
for which language data are available.
In these data, I estimate ﬁxed-eﬀect (or conditional) Logit models of an individual’s propensity
to save (versus not save) in the current year, regressed on the FTR strength of that individual’s
language and a rich set of ﬁxed-eﬀects for country and individual characteristics.5 These ﬁxed-
eﬀects control for a person’s: country of residence, income decile within that country, marital
status (with 6 diﬀerent classiﬁcations), sex, education (with 8 diﬀerent classiﬁcations), age (in ten-
year bins), number of children, survey wave, and religion (from a set of 74) all interacted (for a
total of 1.4 billion categories). Eﬀectively, this analysis matches an individual with others who are
identical on every dimension listed above, but who speak a diﬀerent language. It then asks within
these groups of otherwise identical individuals, do those who speak high-FTR languages behave
diﬀerently than those who speak low-FTR languages? In addition, immigrants are excluded from
this analysis so as to avoid conﬂating diﬀerences in a household’s primary language with diﬀerences
between natives and immigrants.
In addition, the WVS allows me to examine the interaction between the eﬀect of language on
savings behavior, and several beliefs and values questions asked of participants. This allows me to
examine to what degree the measured eﬀect of language on savings behavior is attenuated by such
things as how much a person reports trusting other people, or how much they report that saving
is an important cultural value. To a limited extent, this allows me to investigate whether language
acts as a marker of deep cultural values that drive savings, or whether language itself has a direct
eﬀect on savings behavior.
3.3 Retirement Assets and Health Behaviors in the SHARE
The second dataset I analyze is the SHARE, the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe
(Börsch-Supan & Jürges 2005). The SHARE is a panel survey that measures the socioeconomic
status and health of retired households in 13 European countries. This allows me to complement
my earlier analysis of saving from the WVS with analyses of both accumulated household wealth,
and other future-oriented behavior measures such as smoking, exercise, and long-run health. Like
my regressions in the WVS, my analysis of the SHARE looks only at within-country language
variation among natives. Unfortunately, the SHARE does not record what language households
4Most importantly, several African countries are well represented in the WVS, have several national languages,
but are not comprehensively studied by any large cross-language tense study. For these languages I rely on individual
grammars which discuss the structure of that languages future tense. Most important were Adu-Amankwah (2003)
for Akan, Nurse (2008) for the Bantoid languages, Olawsky (1999) and Lehr, Redden & Balima (1966) for Dagbani
and Moore, Newman (2000) for Hausa, Carrell (1970), Emenanjo (1978), Ndimele (2009), and Uwalaka (1997) for
Igbo, and Awobuluyi (1978), and Gaye & Beecroft (1964) for Yoruba.
5I use Chamberlain’s (1980) ﬁxed-eﬀect (or conditional) logit model to estimate these regressions, since I have
very few observations within each group deﬁned by my ﬁxed-eﬀects. The Chamberlain model solves the resulting
incidental-parameters problem.
4speak at home. Instead, I exploit the fact that the survey instrument is oﬀered in multiple languages;
households can choose to take the survey in any of the national languages of their country. I use
this choice as a proxy for their primary language.
Towards an analysis of the language and accumulated savings, I estimate several OLS models
of total net household retirement assets regressed on a household’s language and increasingly rich
sets of ﬁxed eﬀects. The SHARE survey attempts a comprehensive measure all assets a household
has, including income, private and public beneﬁt payments, and all forms of assets (stocks, bonds,
housing, etc.) For my other analyses I study the eﬀect of language on several health measures. The
SHARE contains several questions on health behaviors (such as smoking and exercise) as well as
several physical-health measurements: body-mass-index, walking speed (as measured by a walking
test), grip strength (as measured by a dynamometer), and respiratory health (peak expiratory air
ﬂow).
All of these regressions include ﬁxed eﬀects similar to those in the WVS so as to aid in compar-
ing results across datasets. The richest of these regressions includes ﬁxed eﬀects for a household’s:
country of residence (13), income decile within that country, marital status (with 6 diﬀerent classiﬁ-
cations), sex, education (with 8 diﬀerent classiﬁcations), age (in ten-year bins), number of children,
and survey wave (2004 and 2006), all interacted for a total of 2.7 million categories. Again, im-
migrant families are excluded to avoid conﬂating diﬀerences driven by language with diﬀerences in
immigrant families.
3.4 National Savings in the OECD
Finally, I study the relationship between language and the national accounts of the OECD from
1970 to present. These data are collected and harmonized by the OECD for all 34 member countries
as well as for the Russian Federation.6 Details on the exact construction of each OECD measure
can be found in the Data Appendix. Importantly, all annual GDP measures are computed using
the expenditure method, with constant PPPs using the OECD base year (2000).
These regressions attempt to determine whether the FTR structure of a country’s language
appears to aﬀect national savings. The form of the national savings equation is a simple linear
relation that follows closely from life-cycle savings theory (see Modigliani 1986 for a review). Es-
sentially, I regress national-savings rates on the level and growth rate of GDP as well as a number
of other country demographics. To this regression I add a weighted measure of the FTR strength
of that country’s languages. This is simply the FTR strength of each of that country’s major
languages, weighted by the percent of the country’s population reports speaking those languages.7
This language measure does not vary by year: these regressions test if the unexplained components
of national savings vary cross-sectionally with a country’s language, and do not try to identify oﬀ
of demographic shifts within a country across time.
4R e s u l t s
If speaking diﬀerently about the future lead individuals to discount the future more, then the
propensity to save should be negatively correlated with strong future-time reference. I examine
this correlation in a regression framework which allows for a rich set of controls.
6I include the Russian Federation in this analysis because as of the writing of this paper they are in the process
of joining the OECD, and were included in the harmonized OECD data.
7These relative language shares were obtained for each country from their national census taken closest to the
year 2000.
54.1 Language, Beliefs and Savings
My ﬁrst set of regressions examines the savings behavior of individuals in the World Values Survey.
T h e s er e g r e s s i o n sa r ec a r r i e do u tu s i n gﬁxed-eﬀect (or conditional) logistic analysis, where the




1+e x p ( )
 (1)
where




In equation 1, the main variable of interest  is a binary-coded characteristic of the
language that the individual speaks at home.  are characteristics of individual  at time ,s u c h
as their self-reported beliefs about trust and savings. The  variables are sets of ﬁxed eﬀects that
are jointly interacted to form groups for the basis of analysis: the conditional-likelihood function
is calculated relative to these groups. That is, individuals are compared only with others who
are identical on every  variable. 
 is a set of ﬁxed eﬀects that can be taken as exogenous,
these are non-choice variables such as age and sex. 
 is a set of ﬁxed eﬀects that are likely
endogenous to an individual’s discount rate, such as income, education and family structure. 
 is
a set of country-wave ﬁxed eﬀects. Empirical estimates of equation 1 are presented in Table 1; all
coeﬃcients are reported as odds ratios.
Table 1: An Individual Saved This Year (WVS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Saved Saved Saved Saved Saved Saved
Strong FTR 0.462 0.717 0.720 0.706 0.695 0.697
[0.070]** [0.113]* [0.115]* [0.102]* [0.091]** [0.092]**
Unemployed 0.677 0.693 0.687 0.688
[0.031]** [0.044]** [0.044]** [0.044]**
Trust 1.082 1.083
[0.045] [0.045]
Saving is Important 1.111
(to teach children) [0.043]**
Fixed Eﬀects:
Age × Sex Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Wave No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income × Edu No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Married × Num Chil No No No Yes Yes Yes
All FEs Interacted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 152,041 64,017 64,017 24,933 23,658 23,658
Regressions are ﬁxed-eﬀect (or conditional) logistic regressions with coeﬃcients reported as odds ratios.
Immigrants are excluded from all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets; all regressions
are clustered at the country level.
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
8See Chamberlain (1980) for details on conditional-logistic analysis, and the data appendix for the exact wording
of this and other questions in the WVS.
6Regression 1 controls only for 
 , (non-choice variables age and sex), so as to summarize
the average diﬀerence in the propensity to save between strong and weak-FTR individuals. The
coeﬃcient of 0462 can be interpreted as strong FTR families saving only 46% as often (at the
yearly level) as weak FTR families. Regressions 2 and 3 add fully-interacted ﬁxed eﬀects for
country, time, income, and education. On top of these, regressions 4 through 6 include controls
for family structure. Regression 4 can be interpreted as demonstrating that even when comparing
only individuals that are identical on every dimension discussed above, individuals who speak a
language with strong FTR are roughly 30% less likely to report having saved this year. This eﬀect
is nearly as large as being unemployed (31%).
Regressions 5 adds “Trust”, (the most studied variable in the large literature on social capital) as
an additional control. “Trust” measures whether an individual thinks “most people can be trusted”.
This measure has a large and marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect on the propensity of an individual to
save; individuals who think others are generally trustworthy are on average 8% more likely to have
saved this year. Interestingly, this eﬀect appears to be largely independent of the eﬀect of language.
Indeed, by comparing regressions 4 and 5 we see that the inclusion of “Trust” if anything, increases
the measured eﬀect of language.
Regressions 6 adds a variable intended to measure saving as an important cultural value. Specif-
ically, this question asks whether “thrift and saving money” is a value which is important to teach
children.9 Unsurprisingly, individuals who report that saving money is important are more likely to
save. Interestingly though, this eﬀect is both smaller than the eﬀect of language (11% versus 30%),
and does not attenuate the eﬀect of language on savings behavior. This can be seen by comparing
regressions 5 and 6. Indeed, across individuals the belief that saving is an important value is almost
completely uncorrelated with the FTR of their language ( =0 07).
Parameter estimates from this ﬁrst set of regressions suggest that a language’s FTR is an impor-
tant predictor of savings behavior. This eﬀect is both large (larger than that of other widely-studied
variables) and survives an aggressive set of controls. Interestingly, it appears to be statistically in-
dependent of what was designed to be a good marker of saving and thrift as a cultural value. This
suggests that the channel through which language aﬀects the propensity to save is largely indepen-
dent of the saving as a self-reported value. Later, I will discuss what this non-attenuation result
suggests about the causal link between language and savings behavior.
Next, I look at which countries in the WVS have numerous native speakers of both weak and
strong FTR languages. Figure 1 plots a histogram of countries in the WVS, organized by what
percent of the country’s survey respondents report speaking a high-FTR language at home. As
Figure 1 shows, the vast majority of countries (72 of 79) have basically no intra-country variation
in future-time reference. This is largely because in most countries one language dominates, and
in many countries with multiple languages those languages share a common FTR structure. For
example, even though Canada has both large English and French speaking populations, both French
and English are high-FTR languages.
In 7 of 79 WVS countries however, at least 5% of the population speak languages that has a
diﬀerent FTR structure than the majority language. These are the countries which provide the
majority of identiﬁcation for the full ﬁxed-eﬀect regressions. Table 2 enumerates these countries,
and reports the coeﬃcient on strong FTR when my regression with the most aggressive controls
(regression 6 in Table 1) is estimated in only that country. Also listed are the percents of the
sample that speak either strong or weak-FTR languages in that country, the languages they speak,
and the N of the country-speciﬁcr e g r e s s i o n .
9See the data appendix for the full wording of these questions in the WVS.
7Table 2: Countries with Large Within-Country FTR Diﬀerences in the WVS
Coef. and SE
Country Weak-FTR Languages % Strong-FTR Languages % on Strong FTR N
Burkina Faso Dyula 16 Fula, French, Moore 84 0.700, [0.391] 137
Estonia Estonian 79 Russian 21 0.000, [0.000] 31
Ethiopia Amharic, Oromo, Sidamo 79 Chaha, Gamo, Tigrinya 21 0.825, [0.359] 208
Malaysia Malay, Mandarin 87 English, Tamil 13 0.742, [0.230] 449
Nigeria Yoruba 31 English, Hausa, Igbo 69 0.764, [0.355] 121
Singapore Malay, Mandarin 63 English, Tamil 37 0.821, [0.151] 664
Switzerland German 52 French, Italian 48 0.362, [0.132] 172
Coeﬃcients (reported as odds ratios) are from ﬁxed-eﬀect (or conditional) logistic regressions with the same
speciﬁcation as regression 6 in Table 1. Immigrants are excluded from all regressions.
Notably, all 7 regressions display coeﬃcients less than 1, consistent with our overall eﬀect. The
coeﬃcient in Estonia is 0 because in that regression, no Estonian speaker who was able to be
matched with a Russian speaker reported not saving. Other than this outlier (which is largely
driven by the small sample size in Estonia) the estimated eﬀect is remarkably stable across this set
of countries, which span multiple continents, regions, and sets of languages.
To conﬁrm this and to explore the robustness of my initial results to additional controls, I es-
timate an additional set of regressions summarized in Table 3. First, I estimate the full regression
(regression 6 in Table 1) separately in the 72 countries with little, and the 7 countries with sizable
within-country FTR variation. I also examine whether these results are being driving by minority
languages, by including as additional regressors for each household both the share of a country’s
speakers who speak their language, and the share that speak a language with the same FTR struc-
ture. Finally, I add as an additional control ﬁxed-eﬀects for self-reported religious denomination
(74 in total), interacted with all of our previous ﬁxed eﬀects.
8Table 3: Additional Control Regressions in the WVS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Saved Saved Saved Saved Saved
Strong FTR 0.934 0.678 0.679 0.528 0.529
[0.261] [0.100]** [0.101]** [0.115]** [0.115]**
Unemployed 0.692 0.637 0.688 0.749 0.748
[0.046]** [0.155] [0.044]** [0.068]** [0.067]**
Trust 1.071 1.273 1.083 1.068 1.068
[0.046] [0.136]* [0.044] [0.051] [0.051]
Saving is Important 1.124 0.979 1.110 1.057
(to teach children) [0.047]** [0.082] [0.043]** [0.060]
Language Share 0.759 0.700 0.699
[0.119] [0.129] [0.130]
FTR Share 1.071 0.467 0.461
[0.190] [0.193] [0.192]
Full set of FEs
from Table 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion FEs No No No Yes Yes
All FEs Interacted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country’s FTR Variation  5% (72)  5% (7) All All All
Observations 21,876 1,782 23,658 13,263 13,263
Regressions are ﬁxed-eﬀect (or conditional) logistic regressions with coeﬃcients reported as odds ratios.
Immigrants are excluded from all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets; all regressions
are clustered at the country level.
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Regressions 1 and 2 conﬁrm our intuition that only the seven countries enumerated in Table 2
have enough within country variation to identify our full regression with country ﬁxed eﬀects. The
coeﬃcient of 0678 is statistically indistinguishable from the coeﬃcient of 0697 Im e a s u r ew h e nt h e
regression is run on the whole sample.
Returning to the whole sample: as an additional control, regression 3 demonstrates that the
eﬀect of language is not driven either by minority languages nor by minority FTR structures. Re-
gressions 4 and 5 include additional ﬁxed-eﬀects for religious denomination (74 in total), interacted
with all of our previous ﬁxed eﬀects. This inclusion does not attenuate the eﬀect of language; com-
paring regression 3 to 4, the measured eﬀect actually increases by 15%. Comparing regression 4 to
5 replicates our earlier non-attenuation ﬁnding: the addition saving as a self-reported value does
not attenuate the main language eﬀect. After the inclusion of religious controls both “trust” and
saving as a cultural value attenuate enough to become statistically insigniﬁcant, while the eﬀect of
language, if anything, strengthens.
4.2 Language and Retirement Assets in Europe
If individuals who speak more strong FTR languages save less in any given year, then we would
expect them to accumulate less savings over time. My next set of regressions examines the cumula-
tive retirement assets of individuals in the retired households in the Survey of Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe. Table 4 summarizes regressions which estimate the equation:




9In equation 2 the dependant variable  is the estimated value of a retired household’s net worth,
including all real assets (homes, businesses and cars), and ﬁnancial assets (money, stocks, bonds,
and life insurance), minus any debt. Unfortunately, unlike the WVS, the SHARE does not ask
households what language they speak at home. Here, the main variable of interest  is
coded using the language that the head of household asked to take the survey in.
The  variables are sets of ﬁxed eﬀects that are jointly interacted to form groups similar to
those in my analysis of the WVS. That is, households are compared only with others who are
identical on every  variable, but who asked to take the survey in a diﬀerent language. 
 is my
set of exogenous ﬁxed eﬀects; here it is the age of the head of household. 
 is a set of ﬁxed eﬀects
that are likely endogenous to a household’s discount rate, such as income, education and family
structure. 
 is a set of country-wave ﬁxed eﬀects. Empirical estimates of equation 2 are presented
in Table 4; all coeﬃcients are reported in Euros.10
Table 4: Household Retirement Assets (SHARE)
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
HHAssets HHAssets HHAssets HHAssets HHAssets
Strong FTR -154,515 -150,498 -145,151 -173,880 -178,744
[68,481]* [12,703]** [15,656]** [9,723]** [25,300]**
Fixed Eﬀects:
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Wave No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income No No Yes Yes Yes
Education No No No Yes Yes
Married × N u m C h i l N oN oN oN oY e s
All FEs Interacted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39,665 39,665 39,665 39,665 39,350
F stat 5.09 140.37 85.96 319.81 49.91
Regressions are ﬁxed-eﬀect OLS regressions where the dependent variable is net household retirement assets
in Euros. Immigrant households are excluded from all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in
brackets; all regressions are clustered at the country level.
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Regressions 2 through 5 identify only oﬀ of within-country variation in language. These regres-
sions are identiﬁed almost entirely oﬀ the fact that Belgium has large Flemish (weak FTR) and
French (strong FTR) speaking populations, and Switzerland has large German (weak FTR), and
French, Italian, and Romansh (strong FTR) speaking populations.
Regressions 1 through 5 show our predicted eﬀect; retired households that speak strong FTR
languages have saved around 170 thousand Euros less by the time they retire. Looking at regressions
1 and 2, we see that the addition of country ﬁxed eﬀects does not signiﬁcantly attenuate the eﬀect of
language. The diﬀerences in cross-country in savings attributable to language appear to be roughly
t h es a m es i z ea st h ed i ﬀerences between diﬀerent FTR groups within Belgium and Switzerland.11
10Details on variable construction: Age is coded in ten-year bins, Income is coded as an intra-country decile, and
Education falls within one of 8 categories provided in the SHARE. For more details on the construction of variables
and the measuring of household net-wroth int he SHARE, see Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2005).
11The average net-household assets in the SHARE is 347 thousand Euros, but the coeﬃcients in Table 2 are
estimated almost entirely oﬀ of Switzerland and Belgium, which are higher (695K and 374K Euros, respectively).
Swiss household net assets were recorded in Francs, which I convert to Euros using the average rate in the year the
survey was taken (1.534 and 1.621 in waves 1 and 2 of the SHARE).
10Table 5 summarizes regressions that contain the same set of demographic ﬁxed eﬀects as in
Regression 5 from Table 4, but increase the level of spatial control by including ﬁxed eﬀects for
intra-country regions. This allows us to examine whether language may be proxying (even within
country) for unobserved diﬀerences between regions, counties or even cities. If for example, families
tend to segregate across regions by language, then I may be attributing institutional diﬀerences
between regions to language.
Table 5: Household Retirement Assets in Belgium and Switzerland
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HHAssets HHAssets HHAssets HHAssets HHAssets
Strong FTR -178,744 -187,424 -256,369 -105,840 -147,410
[44,038]** [39,268]** [318,346] [338,223] [744,983]
Full set of FEs
from Table 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FEs 2 (BE & CH) 1 11 1 7
All FEs Interacted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country BE & CH Belgium Belgium Switzerland Switzerland
Observations 5,937 4,394 4,393 1,543 1,543
F stat 16.47 22.78 2.44 0.10 0.16
Regressions are ﬁxed-eﬀect OLS regressions where the dependent variable is net household retirement assets
in Euros. Immigrant households are excluded from all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in
brackets; all regressions are clustered at the household level.
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Comparing regressions 2 and 3 (in Belgium) and regions regressions 4 and 5 (in Switzerland)
shows that the addition of ﬁner spatial controls (in the form of region dummies) does not appear
to attenuate the eﬀect of language on retirement savings. This suggests that the language eﬀect we
are measuring is not explained by unobserved spatial diﬀe r e n c e s ,a tl e a s tn o to nt h el e v e lw ea r e
able to capture with the regions coded in the SHARE.
4.3 Language and Health
The SHARE, in addition to measuring household wealth, also asks each member of the household
about their health behaviors and records several measures of physical health. I look at these
measures next, since if a languages aﬀect their speakers intertemporal choices, this should also
have implications for their speakers’ health behaviors and long-run health. More speciﬁcally, if an
obligatory future-tense reduces the psychological importance of the future, we would predict that
it would lead to more smoking, less exercise, and worse long-run health.
To investigate this, Table 6 summarizes regressions investigating the eﬀect of FTR on health
variables found in the SHARE. Some of these measures are binary, such as ever having smoked
heavily, remaining physically active, and being medically obese. For these regressions I estimate
ﬁxed-eﬀect logit model similar to equation 1. The other measures I examine, walking speed, grip
strength, and peak expiratory ﬂow, are commonly studied measures of long-run health. These
measure the spread at which a person comfortably walks, the maximum among of force they can
apply while squeezing a dynometer, and their maximum exhalatory air ﬂow (lung strength). For
these regressions I estimate ﬁxed-eﬀect OLS regressions similar to equation 2.
11Table 6: Health Behaviors and Measures of Health (SHARE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Smoked Phy Act Obesity Walk Sp Grip Str. Peak Flow
Strong FTR 1.241 0.709 1.131 -0.028 -0.899 -16.083
[0.042]** [0.025]** [0.007]** [0.101] [0.049]** [2.806]**
Full set of FEs
from Table 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All FEs Interacted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,750 9,135 11,958 6,038 51,571 26,836
R-squared 0.85 0.84 0.73
Regressions 1, 2, and 3 are ﬁxed-eﬀect (or conditional) logistic regressions with coeﬃcients reported as odds
ratios. The dependant variables are having ever smoked daily for a year or more, engaging in regular physical
activity, and being medically obese. Regressions 4, 5, and 6 are ﬁxed-eﬀect OLS regressions for measures of
old-age health; walking speed (m/sec), grip strength (kg), and peak expiratory ﬂow(L/min). Immigrants are
excluded from all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets; all regressions are clustered
at the country level.
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Regression 1 indicates that a strongly grammaticalized FTR leads to a 24% higher probability of
having ever smoked (daily for a year or more). This is consistent with our ﬁndings on savings if the
decision to smoke trades oﬀ immediate beneﬁts versus future health costs. Similarly, regression 2
indicates that strong FTR leads to a 29% lower probability of being physically active. Regressions
3, 4, 5, and 6 examine the eﬀect of strong FTR on long-run measures of health. While there
appears to be no eﬀect on walking speed, speaking a strong FTR language is associated with a 13%
higher probability of being medically obese, a reduction in grip strength of almost a kilogram, and
a reduction in peak expiratory ﬂow of 16 liters per minute.
4.4 Linguistic Eﬀects on National Savings Rates in the OECD
The evidence on both individual and household behavior we have presented so far supports our
hypotheses that strongly grammaticalized FTR languages are associated with less future-oriented
choices by its speakers. If, as our previous results suggest, people who speak strong-FTR languages
discount more heavily, then it seems natural to expect that the countries in which they live would
have lower equilibrium savings rates. This prediction does not immediately follow from theory,
however.
Samuelson (1937) showed that when the duration of a potential project is ﬁxed, the value of
that project may not be even weakly decreasing in the interest rate. Arrow and Levhari (1969)
established that if an agent controls when a project terminates, then in deterministic settings the
natural monotonic relationship must hold; the value of investment in projects must be monotonically
decreasing in the interest rate. In Hick’s book Capital and Time (1973), this is referred to as the
Fundamental Theorem of Capital. Under the conditions for which this relationship holds then, it
is natural to predict that countries with strong FTR languages will, on average, save less.
Table 7 summarizes a ﬁrst set of regressions which test this prediction. These regressions closely
follow Barrow and McDonald (1979), who run similar regressions on the same OECD national
savings data that we investigate here. The basic functional form of these regressions is:
(( − )) = 0 + 1(Str. FTR) + 2(1) + 3(−1) + 4() +  (3)
12where annual observations for each country in the OECD are indexed by country  =1 35
and year  = 19702009 Details on the construction of each variable can be found in the Data
Appendix, most importantly:  is total consumption while  is GDP,  is the average
growth rate of the country from 1993 to 2009 (the earliest date for which data is available for
all countries).and “Strong FTR” is weighted by the percent of the country’s population reports
speaking each of their major languages.
This form of this savings equation is a simple linear relation that is based on simple forms of
the Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) of savings (see Modigliani 1986 for a good review of the theory).
Notice that as equation 3 is written, all terms in the savings equation except (1) imply that a
savings function that is homogeneous of degree 0, which is to say that the savings rate is independent
of the level or unit of income. This assumption has theoretical support in the LCH model, and
allows for a speciﬁcation in which units of measurement do not need to be comparable across
countries. It may be violated if, as Feldstein (1977) points out, higher incomes lead to a increase
in the share of life spent in retirement. This leads to the presence of the 1 term, which can test
for such eﬀects as measured by a positive 2. Essentially this term allows the marginal propensity
to consume out of income to diﬀer by the level of development of a country.
In addition, OECD data allows for the inclusion of a number of important demographic controls:
5() + 6() + 7(   ) + 8()
These control for the unemployment rate, the fraction of the population that are over 65, the
fraction under 15, and the per-capita fraction of GDP spent on social security payments (deﬁned as
% GDP spent on disability, old age, and survivors beneﬁts divided by the fraction of the population
that are over 65). Empirical estimates of equation 3 are presented in Table 7.
13Table 7: Gross Domestic Savings Rates in the OECD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDSR GDSR GDSR GDSR
Strong FTR -8.035 -5.518 -5.309 -4.046
[2.813]** [1.503]** [1.786]** [1.305]**
1/P C G D P  136.863 143.727 43.580
[48.654]** [57.394]* [56.031]
PCGDP−1 /P C G D P  -37.106 -23.486 -20.016 -21.766
[10.179]** [6.645]** [7.423]* [6.883]**
CAGR -0.110 -0.248 -0.302 0.010
[0.096] [0.039]** [0.125]* [0.143]
Unemployment (%) -0.061 -0.344 -0.163 -0.141
[0.237] [0.177] [0.174] [0.135]
Old (%) -1.186 -1.077 -1.222 -0.969
[0.408]** [0.327]** [0.356]** [0.222]**
Young (%) -0.464 -0.856 -0.993 -0.378
[0.337] [0.277]** [0.313]** [0.319]
Soc Sec (%GDP / Old) -4.184
[2.872]
Fixed Eﬀects: None None None Region (7)
Observations 904 904 614 904
R-squared 0.56 0.67 0.66 0.75
Regressions are OLS regressions where the dependent variable is a country’s Gross Domestic Savings Rates
in year . Observations are for OECD countries from 1970 to 2009. All regressions are weighted by the
population of the country in that year. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets and clustered at the
country level.
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Regression 1 estimates a version of equation 3 that is fully homogeneous of degree 0; regressions
2 and 3 add a term which allows savings rates to vary with the size of the economy, and not just
its short and long-run growth rates. These regressions suggests that countries with a strong FTR
save on average around 5% (percentage points) less per year than do countries with weak FTR, a
result consistent with our earlier results on household savings and health measures. Regression 4
includes region ﬁxed-eﬀects, where the OECD countries are apportioned into 7 regions: Australia,
E & W Europe, the Middle East, N & S America, and SE Asia.
4.5 Linguistic Eﬀects in the OECD: Robustness Checks and an Aggregation
Reversal
One concern with the result that strong-FTR countries tend to save more is that the FTR strength
of countries is spatially correlated. In Western Europe for example, most strong-FTR countries
are in the northern half of the continent. This leads to the possibility that (at least in Western
Europe), the eﬀects I attribute to strong FTR could actually be due to a correlated spatial factor
(like climate or distance from Mediterranean trade routes) which leads northern-European countries
to save more than southern-European countries. Similar stories might also invalidate our results
on other continents.
14To examine whether these types of spatial confounds are a concern, I re-estimate equation 3
with an additional control variable, “distance from equator”. This is the distance from a country’s
capital to the equator in thousands of miles. If the eﬀects of language reported in Table 7 were
actually due to a spatial factor correlated with Latitude, then we would expect the inclusion of
“distance from equator” to attenuate or eliminate the coeﬃcient on language. Table 8 reports the
results of these regressions.
Table 8: Gross Domestic Savings Rates in the OECD by Region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDSR GDSR GDSR GDSR
Strong FTR -5.578 -7.343 -8.951 -16.310
[1.456]** [1.814]** [4.634] [5.560]*
1/P C G D P  135.863 -163.861 19.524 127.156
[49.985]* [87.815] [37.737] [79.621]
PCGDP−1 /P C G D P  -24.360 -35.846 -2.111 -23.717
[5.504]** [4.326]** [8.143] [8.045]*
CAGR -0.246 0.117 -0.191 1.169
[0.040]** [0.624] [0.085] [0.608]
Unemployment (%) -0.329 0.070 -0.642 -0.433
[0.185] [0.119] [0.120]** [0.234]
Old (%) -1.061 -0.157 -1.158 -1.103
[0.335]** [0.379] [0.698] [0.315]**
Young (%) -0.859 0.607 -1.017 -0.798
[0.277]** [0.334] [0.443] [0.350]
Dist from Equator -0.277 -5.007 -2.300 9.766
(1K miles) [0.983] [2.050]* [3.485] [4.260]




Observations 904 539 109 256
R-squared 0.67 0.41 0.73 0.85
Regressions are OLS regressions where the dependent variable is a country’s Gross Domestic Savings Rates
in year . Observations are for OECD countries from 1970 to 2009. Regression 1 includes: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Regression 2 includes: Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Israel, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey. Regression 3 includes:
Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States. All regressions
are weighted by the population of the country in that year. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets
and clustered at the country level.
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
The results in Tables 8 suggest that this type of spatial confound seems unlikely. Regressions 1
through 4 demonstrate that the eﬀects I attribute to language are not attenuated by the addition
of “dist from equator”, neither in Western Europe nor in any other major OECD region. Com-
paring regression 2 from Table 7 to regression 1 in Table 8, we see that the eﬀect of language on
savings is unchanged (−5518 vs. −5578). If anything, the inclusion of north-south spatial controls
strengthen the measured eﬀect of language in every region of OECD.
15Interestingly, the coeﬃcient on “dist from equator” in regression 2 is the opposite sign of the
common observation that northern-European countries tend to save more than their southern coun-
terparts. Quite the contrary, I ﬁnd that when language controls are included, European countries
save on average 5 percentage of their GDP less for every thousand miles further north they lie. To
further investigate this ﬁnding, I re-estimate equation 3 restricted to Western Europe, examining
what eﬀect the inclusion and removal of language controls have on the measured eﬀect of distance
from the equator. Table 9 details these regressions.
Table 9: Aggregation Reversal in Western Europe by FTR Strength
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDSR GDSR GDSR GDSR GDSR
Dist from Equator 0.980 1.510 -5.007 -2.582 -4.786
(1K miles) [1.999] [1.675] [2.050]* [2.002] [2.095]
Strong FTR -7.343
[1.814]**
1/P C G D P  -71.439 -163.861 -106.322 -100.616
[98.879] [87.815] [67.106] [155.671]
PCGDP−1 /P C G D P  -29.947 -35.846 -34.836 -34.282
[6.735]** [4.326]** [4.986]** [7.738]**
CAGR -0.130 0.117 1.266 -0.576
[0.707] [0.624] [0.381]** [0.961]
Unemployment (%) -0.084 0.070 -0.391 0.209
[0.173] [0.119] [0.148]* [0.157]
Old (%) -1.103 -0.157 -0.036 -0.455
[0.444]* [0.379] [0.321] [0.688]
Young (%) -0.539 0.607 -0.035 0.254
[0.387] [0.334] [0.288] [0.289]
FTR of Country: All All All Weak Strong
Observations 720 539 539 323 216
R-squared 0.01 0.19 0.41 0.58 0.24
Regressions are OLS regressions where the dependent variable is a country’s Gross Domestic Savings Rates
in year . Observations are for Western-European OECD countries from 1970 to 2009. Regression 4 includes:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and
Switzerland. Regression 5 includes: France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Regressions 1, 2, and 3 include both sets of countries. All regressions are weighted by the population of the
country in that year. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets and clustered at the country level.
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
These regressions suggest that what is often thought of as a north-versus-south divide in Euro-
pean savings rates may be better explained by language than geography. In speciﬁc, language pat-
terns appear to induce an aggregation reversal in savings rates. That is, while northern-European
countries tend to save more that southern-European countries; after controlling for language the
opposite is true (countries save more the further South they are).Regressions 1 and 2 demonstrate
the commonly held wisdom that countries appear to have higher savings rates the further north
they lie in Europe, both without and with economic controls. The coeﬃcient in regression 2 can be
interpreted as saying that holding economic conditions constant, a western-European country saves
161.5% of GDP more per year for every one thousand miles more north their capital lies. However
after controlling for “strong FTR” in regression 3 the sign ﬂips: a country saves on average 5% less
for every thousand miles it lies further north. Regressions 4 and 5 demonstrate this aggregation
reversal directly. Within both sets of western European countries (strong and weak FTR), countries
that lie further north save less than their southern counterparts.
5 Discussion
5.1 Intertemporal Choice and the Determinants of Discounting
At least since Samuelson (1937) introduced the discounted-utility model, rates of time preference
have been seen as a central part of almost all important economic decisions. Despite this centrality,
most economic analysis takes the level of time discounting for granted as exogenous. Notable
exceptions include Barro & Becker (1989) which models discount rates as a function of fertility, and
Becker & Mulligan (1997) which models a consumer who invests in lowering their own discounting
of future utility. The determinants of time-preference has also been investigated in related ﬁelds.
In sociobiology, Rogers (1994) models the eﬀect of natural selection on time preferences. He ﬁnds
that if evolution sets the discount rate equal to the rate of substitution of Darwinian ﬁtness, then
people will discount the future at a rate of ln(2) per generation, which is about 2% per year.
A large literature in child development studies the acquisition of language in children, and several
papers have studied the speciﬁc question of how children acquire the ability to conceptualize and
speak about time. Most notably, Harner (1981) ﬁnds that among English-speaking children the use
of the future tense begins by age 3 and is relatively developed by age 5. Szagun (1978) ﬁnds that
the time-path of this development is identical in matched pairs of English and German children,
with these pairs of children showing no discernible diﬀerence in the rate at which they acquire and
use the future tense. This is despite the fact that English is a strong-FTR language while German
a weak-FTR language. This distinction is reﬂected in Szagun’s study, but only among adults: the
German-speaking parents of the children Szagun studied used the future tense much less than the
English-speaking parents did. That is, diﬀerences in the use of the future tense across languages
do not seem to manifest themselves in early language acquisition, they emerge later in life. While
far from dispositive, this suggests that the diﬀerences that I study between weak and strong-FTR
languages do not reﬂect either innate cognitive nor cultural diﬀerences between speakers of diﬀerent
languages, at least as reﬂected in the development of children through age 5.
Some empirical ﬁndings suggest that individual’s time preferences are closely linked with other
characteristics. Warner & Pleeter (2001) found large amounts of variation in personal discount rates
among military personal who were oﬀered either a lump-sum payment or an annuity upon leaving
the military. Suggestively, these discount rates were highly correlated with age, race, sex, and
scores on an IQ-like test. Similarly, Frederick (2005) ﬁnds that even at elite universities, students
who score high on an IQ-like “cognitive-reﬂection test” showed much lower discount rates.
Closest to this paper, a large literature in psychology and behavioral economics studies numerous
well-documented departures from the discounted-utility model. For example, Lowenstein (1988)
ﬁnds a reference-point eﬀect: people demand much more compensation to delay receiving a good
by one year, (from today to a year from now), than they are willing to pay to move up consumption
of that same good (from a year from now to today). Read & Frederick et al. (2005) show that
discount rates are lower when time is described using calendar dates (e.g., on October 17) than
when described in terms of the corresponding delay (e.g., in six months).12
12See Frederick, Lowenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) for an excellent review of this literature.
17Many of these departures are framing eﬀects: instances where how an intertemporal choice
is described aﬀects what decisions people make. This paper can be seen as asking whether the
structure of a person’s language can subtly act as such a frame at the moment of decision, with
cumulatively large eﬀects. Alternatively, my ﬁndings are consistent with languages which force
individuals to mark the future as distinct from present leading to a mindset in which the future is
discounted more heavily.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Overall, my ﬁndings are largely consistent with the hypothesis that languages with obligatory
future-time reference lead their speakers to engage in less future-oriented behavior. On savings, the
evidence is consistent on multiple levels: at an individual’s propensity to save, to long-run eﬀects
on retirement wealth, and in the aggregate with national savings rates. These ﬁndings also extend
to health behaviors ranging from smoking to exercise, and reﬂect in several measures of long-run
health. All of these results survive after comparing only individuals who are identical on numerous
demographic levels, and who were born and raised in the same country.
One important issue in interpreting these results is the possibility that language is not causing
but rather reﬂecting deeper diﬀerences that drive savings behavior. These available data provide
preliminary evidence that much of the measured eﬀects I ﬁnd are causal, for several reasons that
I have outlined in the paper. Mainly, self-reported measures of savings as a cultural value appear
to both drive savings behavior, and are completely uncorrelated with both language. In addition,
diﬀerences in the use of FTR do not seem to correspond to cognitive or developmental diﬀerences
in the acquisition of language. This suggests that the eﬀect of language that I measure occurs
through a channel that is independent of either cultural or cognitive diﬀerences between linguistic
groups.
Never the less, the possibility that language acts only as a powerful marker of some deeper driver
of intertemporal preferences not can not be completely ruled out. This possibility is intriguing in
itself, as the diﬀerences I identify oﬀ of in languages are themselves very old. In Europe for example,
Dahl (2000) notes that the boundaries of the “futureless” area were already set about two-thousand
years ago by a proto-German language, and this was a relatively recent change in the evolution
of future-time reference. Additional evidence language’s role in shaping intertemporal choice is
the goal of ongoing experimental work (Boroditsky and Chen, 2011), which hopes to experimental
isolate the exact channels through which this linguistic-savings eﬀect occurs.
187 Data Statements
This paper uses data from SHARE release 2.3.1, as of July 29th 2010. SHARE data collec-
tion in 2004-2007 was primarily funded by the European Commission through its 5th and 6th
framework programmes (project numbers QLK6-CT-2001- 00360; RII-CT- 2006-062193; CIT5-CT-
2005-028857). Additional funding by the US National Institute on Aging (grant numbers U01
AG09740-13S2; P01 AG005842; P01 AG08291; P30 AG12815; Y1-AG-4553-01; OGHA 04-064; R21
AG025169) as well as by various national sources is gratefully acknowledged (see http://www.share-
project.org for a full list of funding institutions).
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8.1 Wording of Questions in the WVS
FAMSAVED: During the past year, did your family (read out and code one answer):
Save money (23%)
Just get by (51%)
Spent some savings and borrowed money (14%)
Spent savings and borrowed money (12%)
TRUST: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to
be very careful in dealing with people? (Code one answer):
Most people can be trusted. (26%)
Need to be very careful. (74%)
CHILDSAVE: Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which,
if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to ﬁve! (Code ﬁve mentions
at the maximum):
Independence Hard work
Feeling of responsibility Imagination
Tolerance and respect for other people Thrift, saving money and things (37%)
Determination, perseverance Religious faith
Unselﬁshness Obedience
8.2 Variables in the SHARE
HHNETWORTH: A household net worth in the SHARE “HHNetWorth” is attempt to measure
all real assets net of any debts on them. It is equal to the estimated value of a household’s: main
residence, real estate other than the main residence, businesses, cars, bank accounts, bonds, stocks,
mutual funds, life insurance, minus mortgage and other debt.
SMOKED: This codes whether an individual reports: “Have you ever smoked cigarettes, cigars,
cigarillos or a pipe daily for a period of at least one year?”
PHYSICALLY ACTIVE: Physical inactivity is deﬁned as “never or almost never engaging in neither
moderate nor vigorous physical activity.” Being physically active is not being inactive.
OBESITY: This is deﬁned as a body-mass-index of 30 or greater.
WALKING SPEED: This was measured only among individuals aged 76 years and older. Walking
speed was averaged over two tests of walking speed, as measured in meters per second.
GRIP STRENGTH: Grip strength is measured with a dynamometer at the interview (in kg).
PEAK FLOW: Peak expiratory ﬂow measures a person’s maximum exhalation air-ﬂow, as measured
with a peak-ﬂow meter (in L/min).
8.3 OECD Variables
All GDP-based measures are computed using the expenditure method, with constant PPPs using
the OECD base year (2000). CAGR is the average growth rate of the country from 1993 to 2009
(the earliest date for which data is available for all countries). Old and Young are the percent of
the population that are older than 65 and younger than 15 in year . Social Security is the percent
of a country’s GDP spent in a given year on disability, old age, and survivors beneﬁts, divided by
the percent of the population over 65.
22Appendix Table: Coded Languages and FTR Values
Language Family Genus FTR
Afrikaans Indo-European Germanic Strong
Akan Niger-Congo Kwa Strong
Alawa Australian Maran Strong
Albanian Indo-European Albanian Strong
Amharic Afro-Asiatic Semitic Weak
Arabic Afro-Asiatic Semitic Strong
Armenian Indo-European Armenian Strong
Azari Altaic Turkic Strong
Azerbaijani Altaic Turkic Strong
Bandjalang Australian Pama-Nyungan Strong
Bambara Niger-Congo Western Mande Weak
Basque Basque Basque Strong
Belorussian Indo-European Slavic Strong
Bemba Niger-Congo Bantoid Strong
Bengali Indo-European Indic Strong
Beja Afro-Asiatic Beja Weak
Bosnian Indo-European Slavic Strong
Bulgarian Indo-European Slavic Strong
Cantonese Sino-Tibetan Chinese Weak
Catalan Indo-European Romance Strong
Cebuano Western Malayo-Polynesian Meso-Philippine Weak
Chaha Afro-Asiatic Semitic Strong
Chichewa Niger-Congo Bantoid Strong
Czech Indo-European Slavic Strong
Dagbani Niger-Congo Gur Strong
Danish Indo-European Germanic Weak
Dutch Indo-European Germanic Weak
Dyula Niger-Congo Western Mande Weak
English Indo-European Germanic Strong
Estonian Finno-Ugric Finnic Weak
Ewe Niger-Congo Kwa Strong
Finnish Finno-Ugric Finnic Weak
Flemish Indo-European Germanic Weak
French Indo-European Romance Strong
Frisian Indo-European Germanic Weak
Fula Niger-Congo Northern Atlantic Strong
Gamo Afro-Asiatic North Omotic Strong
Galician Indo-European Romance Strong
Georgian Kartvelian Kartvelian Strong
German Indo-European Germanic Weak
Greek Indo-European Greek Strong
Guarani Tupian Tupi-Guarani Strong
Gujarati Indo-European Indic Strong
23Appendix Table: Coded Languages and FTR Values (Continued)
Language Family Genus FTR
Hakka Sino-Tibetan Chinese Weak
Hausa Afro-Asiatic West Chadic Strong
Hawaiian Eastern Malayo-Polynesian Oceanic Weak
Hebrew Afro-Asiatic Semitic Strong
Hindi Indo-European Indic Strong
Hungarian Finno-Ugric Ugric Strong
Icelandic Indo-European Germanic Weak
Igbo Niger-Congo Igboid Strong
Irish Indo-European Celtic Strong
Isekiri Niger-Congo Defoid Strong
Indonesian Western Malayo-Polynesian Sundic Weak
Italian Indo-European Romance Strong
Japanese Japanese Japanese Weak
Javanese Western Malayo-Polynesian Sundic Weak
Kammu Austro-Asiatic (Mon-Khmer) Palaung-Khmuic Strong
Kannada Dravidian Southern Dravidian Strong
Karaim Altaic Turkic Strong
Korean Korean Korean Strong
Kikuyu Niger-Congo Bantoid Weak
Kurdish Indo-European Iranian Strong
Latvian Indo-European Baltic Strong
Lithuanian Indo-European Baltic Strong
Lozi Niger-Congo Bantoid Strong
Luganda Niger-Congo Bantoid Strong
Luxembourgish Indo-European Germanic Weak
Malay Western Malayo-Polynesian Sundic Weak
Maltese Afro-Asiatic Semitic Weak
Macedonian Indo-European Slavic Strong
Mandarin Sino-Tibetan Chinese Weak
Maori Western Malayo-Polynesian Oceanic Weak
Moldavian Indo-European Romance Strong
Montenegrin Indo-European Slavic Strong
Moore Niger-Congo Gur Strong
Norwegian Indo-European Germanic Weak
Oromo Afro-Asiatic Cushitic Weak
Panjabi Indo-European Indic Strong
Persian Indo-European Iranian Strong
Polish Indo-European Slavic Strong
Portuguese Indo-European Romance Strong
Quechua Quechuan Quechuan Strong
Romanian Indo-European Romance Strong
Romansh Indo-European Romance Strong
Russian Indo-European Slavic Strong
24Appendix Table: Coded Languages and FTR Values (Continued)
Language Family Genus FTR
Serbo-Croatian Indo-European Slavic Strong
Slovak Indo-European Slavic Strong
Slovene Indo-European Slavic Strong
Sotho (Northern) Niger-Congo Bantoid Strong
Seraiki Indo-European Indic Strong
Sesotho Niger-Congo Bantoid Strong
Sidamo Afro-Asiatic Cushitic Weak
Spanish Indo-European Romance Strong
Sumatranese Western Malayo-Polynesian Sundic Weak
Sundanese Western Malayo-Polynesian Sundic Weak
Suomea Finno-Ugric Finnic Weak
Swati Niger-Congo Bantoid Strong
Swedish Indo-European Germanic Weak
Swahili Niger-Congo Bantoid Strong
Swiss French Indo-European Romance Strong
Swiss German Indo-European Germanic Weak
Swiss Italian Indo-European Romance Strong
Tagalog Western Malayo-Polynesian Meso-Philippine Strong
Tamil Dravidian Southern Dravidian Strong
Tenyer Niger-Congo Gur Strong
Thai Tai-Kadai Kam-Tai Strong
Tigrinya Afro-Asiatic Semitic Strong
Tsonga Niger-Congo Bantoid Strong
Tswana Niger-Congo Bantoid Strong
Turkish Altaic Turkic Strong
Ukrainian Indo-European Slavic Strong
Urdu Indo-European Indic Strong
Uzbek Altaic Turkic Strong
Venda Niger-Congo Bantoid Strong
Vietnamese Austro-Asiatic (Mon-Khmer) Viet-Muong Weak
Wolaytta Afro-Asiatic North Omotic Strong
Wolof Niger-Congo Northern Atlantic Strong
Xhosa Niger-Congo Bantoid Strong
Yoruba Niger-Congo Defoid Weak
Zulu Niger-Congo Bantoid Strong
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